







Does Relationship Lending Still Matter in the Consumer Banking Sector? 





Jessica Holmes, Ph.D. 
Jonathan Isham, Ph.D. 
Ryan Petersen. B.A. 



















DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE 
MIDDLEBURY, VERMONT 05753 
 
http://www.middlebury.edu/~econ 
   2 
Does Relationship Lending Still Matter in the Consumer Banking Sector? 




Jessica Holmes, Ph.D. 
Jonathan Isham, Ph.D. 
Ryan Petersen. B.A. 




Department of Economics 
Middlebury College 





Address all correspondences to: 
 
Jessica Holmes 
Department of Economics 
Munroe Hall 
Middlebury College 
Middlebury, VT 05753 
 
jholmes@middlebury.edu 








   3 
 
 
Does Relationship Lending Still Matter in the Consumer Banking Sector? 
Evidence from Two Financial Service Organizations in Vermont  
 
 
We use actual loan applications submitted to a community development 
credit union (CDCU) and a traditional community bank to examine the 
role of relationship lending in the automobile loan market.  We first show 
that the community bank relies upon credit scoring, not relationship 
lending; low-income households with poor credit histories are very 
unlikely to receive car loans from this traditional bank.  We then show that 
relationship lending is a critical factor in the loan decision at the CDCU; 
low-income households with strong ties to the institution are likely to 
receive loans, despite poor credit histories. We conclude that as 
consolidation, deregulation and technology move mainstream financial 
institutions away from relationship lending and toward credit scoring, 
CDCUs will occupy an increasingly critical niche for low-income 
households.   4 
Does Relationship Lending Still Matter in the Consumer Banking Sector? 




An extensive theoretical literature confirms that asymmetric information between 
borrower and lender can lead to excess demand in traditional credit markets (Jaffee and 
Russell 1976, 1984; Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Williamson 1987).  
Under conditions of asymmetric information, rationing by price may lead to adverse 
selection since rising interest rates increase the average “riskiness” of the borrower, 
potentially reducing profit per dollar lent.  Thus, a “bank-optimal” interest rate can 
emerge at a rate lower than is necessary to clear the market, but above which expected 
profit per dollar lent falls.   
Empirical studies on relationship lending
1 have shown that information obtained 
through personal interactions between borrower and lender can reduce information 
asymmetries, lower the cost of financial capital and lessen credit rationing in the markets 
for both small business loans (e.g., Berger and Udell 2002; Cole 1998; Blackwell and 
Winters 1997; Scott 2004; Siles, Hanson and Robison 1994) and consumer loans (e.g., 
Chakravarty and Scott 1999; Holmes, Isham and Wasilewski 2004). However, as 
consolidation, deregulation, and technological advances transform the financial services 
sector, the relative importance of relationship lending is decreasing.  Consolidation in the 
banking industry is eroding the market share of small banks that traditionally base 
lending decisions on qualitative soft information (e.g., character, motivation) and 
increasing the market share of money centers and super-regional banks that rely heavily   5 
on quantitative hard information (e.g., credit scores, income, financial ratios) (Cole, 
Goldberg and White 2004; Scott 2004). 
2  Moreover, the growth of Internet banking, 
branchless banks and ATMs as well as technological advances in information processing, 
credit scoring and automated underwriting have limited the opportunity and need for 
personal interactions with loan officers. Some researchers suggest that technological 
improvements have enabled lenders to make 80 percent or more of their lending 
decisions without the involvement of a loan officer (Mester 1997; Palla 2000).  
The diminishing role of relationship lending is likely to have the greatest impact 
on low-income households.  Such families are often credit rationed due to the relatively 
high cost of assessing their creditworthiness: their imperfect or non-existent credit 
histories mandate more time-consuming risk assessment and customized loan products 
(Attanasio, Goldberg and Kyriazidou 2000; Grant 2003; Hogarth and O’Donnell 2000; 
Munnell, Browne, McEneaney and Toottell 1996; Villegas 1989). Holmes, Isham and 
Wasilewski (2004) show that when credit histories are unknown (as is often the case with 
low-income households), the lender/borrower relationship becomes a particularly 
important determinant of loan approval; that is, borrowers without credit histories are 
more likely to be denied loans when they have no relationship with the lender.   
  Community development credit unions (CDCUs) may be able to counteract this 
harmful trend.  CDCUs are financial institutions dedicated to, and governed by, the 
members of a low-income community.
 3 By combining one-on-one financial counseling 
with flexible lending, CDCUs have successfully relied on relationship lending to provide 
financial services and affordable capital to underserved areas across the U.S.
4 The 
‘common bond’ restriction has also allowed CDCUs to incorporate member reputation   6 
into lending decisions, further reducing information asymmetries associated with high 
risk lending. Peer pressure and moral suasion among (mutually liable) members have also 
increased the ability of CDCUs to reduce default risk. Lastly, as non-profit institutions, 
CDCUs return earnings to their members through better-priced products, providing 
additional incentive for members to monitor potentially high-risk peers. It is through 
these relationship and peer lending practices that CDCUs have lowered the cost of 
financial capital and decreased the existence of credit rationing among low-income 
populations. As a credit union with the unique mission to cater to the financially 
underserved, CDCUs may be one of the few remaining financial institutions to still rely 
on relationship lending in credit decisions.  
Using data from a CDCU and a more traditional community bank, we examine 
the role of relationship lending in the market for automobile loans. Rather than relying on 
surveys or hypothetical loan applications (as is commonly done in the literature), we use 
actual loan applications submitted to each institution to assess the relative importance of 
hard and soft information in bona fide credit decisions.  We first show that credit scoring, 
rather than relationship lending, is relied upon by the community bank, and that low-
income households with imperfect or non-existent credit histories are very unlikely to 
receive car loans from this traditional bank.  We then show that relationship lending is a 
critical factor in the car loan decision at the CDCU; low-income households with poor or 
unknown credit histories, but strong ties to the institution, are able to receive car loans. 
This provides preliminary evidence that as consolidation, deregulation and technology 
move mainstream financial institutions away from relationship lending and toward credit   7 
scoring, CDCUs will occupy an increasingly critical niche as the credit-supplier for low-
income households.  
The paper is structured as follows:  in Section II, we introduce the two financial 
institutions and illustrate the difference between the two sets of consumers that apply to 
these institutions for car loans.  In Section III, we present our empirical strategy, and in 
Section IV we present the econometric results.  Section V concludes. 
 
1.  The Community Development Credit Union and the Community Bank  
  The two lending institutions compared in this paper are Vermont's Opportunities 
Credit Union (OCU) and a community bank in Addison County, Vermont. While both 
offer similar deposit products (e.g., checking and savings accounts) and loans (e.g. real 
estate, auto, personal, small business), there are important differences between the two 
institutions. The OCU, founded in 1989 by a coalition of faith-based organizations, is a 
CDCU with total assets of $29 million and serves members in over 200 Vermont towns. 
The community bank, established over 50 years ago, is much larger, with total assets over 
$150 million. However, its service area is concentrated in the twenty-three towns of 
Addison County. It is one of six banks with branches in the county. 
  While anyone can apply for a loan at the community bank, OCU loans are 
restricted to members only. In order to become an OCU member, individuals must be 
willing to pay a $5.00 initiation fee and deposit at least $5.00 in a share account.  The 
other distinguishing feature of the OCU is its heavy reliance on counseling-based lending; 
OCU loan officers work closely with low-income borrowers to establish money 
management skills and develop reasonable savings and loan repayment plans. For   8 
example, individuals without credit histories are often extended ‘tracker’ loans in order to 
establish a positive credit history and borrowers in financial crisis are provided ample 
opportunity to restructure loans rather than face repossession and stiff penalties. The loan 
officers also encourage applicants to provide other soft information, such as character 
references from employers, landlords and community members, when applying for a loan. 
  The comparisons in this paper are based on all car loan applications submitted to 
the community bank over the period 1999 to 2001 (n = 297) and all car loan applications 
submitted to the Working Wheels Program at the OCU over the period 1998 to 2002 (n = 
609).   Working Wheels began in 1998 as a response to the lack of adequate public 
transportation in Vermont and the subsequent necessity of private automobile access for 
workers.  Working Wheels clients are typically referred to the OCU by one of the five 
Community Action Agencies (CAAs) in the state or by friends, employers, and car 
dealers.  
  For each application, information was collected on demographic and financial 
characteristics as well as the credit history of the potential borrower. Tables 1 and 2 
present averages for approved and rejected applicants at, respectively, the community 
bank and the OCU. 
  The demographic variables listed in Table 1 for the community bank are: age of 
the applicant; the percentage of borrowers who reside in the town where the bank is 
located; the number of years that the applicant has spent at his or her current address; and 
the percentage of applicants with a prior account (hence, a relationship) with the bank.  
Since this was the only relationship information contained in the loan file, it represents 
the best available proxy for relationship strength. Approved applicants lived more than   9 
two years longer in the bank’s community and they had a significantly stronger 
“relationship” with the bank than did rejected applicants. 
  The financial variables defined for the community bank are: the applicant’s (and 
co-applicant’s, if any) monthly income and the percentage of applicants who had 
declared bankruptcy within the past 10 years.  Average monthly incomes were 
significantly higher and bankruptcy rates were significantly lower for approved 
applicants than for their rejected counterparts. 
  The loan-specific variables defined for the community bank include: the 
percentage of car loan applications with co-signers; the applicant’s credit score; the car’s 
value at the time of the application; the loan-to-value ratio; and the community bank’s 
markup above the prime (interest) rate at the time of the loan.  Approved applicants had a 
significantly higher percentage of co-signers, higher credit scores, smaller loan-to-value 
ratios, and smaller markups than did rejected applicants at the community bank. 
  The three groups of variables ? demographic, financial, and loan-specific ? 
were, with few exceptions, similarly defined for the OCU.  Here, an OCU member for at 
least two months was regarded to have a relationship with the credit union.
5  Applicants 
approved at the OCU were slightly older and more likely to have a “relationship” with 
the credit union than rejected applicants.   
  Apart from the financial variables already defined for the community bank, the 
OCU recorded the applicant’s debt-to-income ratio, that is, the ratio of the borrower’s 
monthly debt to his or her monthly income.  Applicants approved at the OCU had 
significantly higher monthly incomes and smaller debt-to-income ratios than did rejected 
applicants.   10 
  OCU loan application forms indicated whether or not the applicant had submitted 
a previous application to the Working Wheels Program.  And, indeed, applicants who 
were approved were more likely to have applied before than applicants who were rejected.  
Moreover, approved applicants at the OCU had significantly higher credit scores on 
average than did rejected applicants. 
  The approval rate for car loans at the community bank was 77 percent while the 
approval rate for the Working Wheels Program at the OCU was 41 percent (p < .001).  
Other noteworthy differences between all applicants (approved and rejected) at the two 
institutions included: credit scores (Bank: 669, OCU: 580, p < .001 for a one-tailed test); 
monthly incomes (Bank: $3335, OCU: $1300, p < .001); a “relationship” with the 
institution (Bank: 79 percent, OCU: 51 percent, p < .001)
6; and the percentage of co-
applicants (Bank: 46 percent, OCU: 13 percent, p < .001).  In all four comparisons, the 
averages were significantly higher for the community bank.  There were, however, no age 
differences between the two groups of applicants (Bank: 35.4 years, OCU: 36.5 years,  
p = .114) nor were there any discernible differences in the percentage who had declared 
bankruptcy in the past 10 years (Bank and OCU: 6 percent, p = .447). 
  In summary, the OCU serves lower income and arguably higher risk clients that 
more conventional lenders would otherwise not regard as bankable. 
 
2.  Empirical Strategy  
  As suggested by the discussion of the mission and history of the OCU in the 
previous section, the objective function of a Working Wheels loan officer is likely to 
differ from that of a traditional financial institution.  The objective of a traditional bank is 
to maximize profits from current and future loans. While the OCU does seek profits in   11 
order to expand its operations, the objective function of the OCU is to provide access to 
capital to lower-income individuals so that they can improve their well-being through 
higher wages and access to better jobs, training and childcare.  At the VCDU, helping 
clients with credit-building and financial education is also a critical part of their mission. 
  The difference in these objective functions implies that a Working Wheels officer 
will, in equilibrium, approve a greater number of loans to more low-income residents 
than will a traditional loan officer.  As noted above, the challenge for the Working 
Wheels officer is to collect enough observable data from each applicant in order to judge 
creditworthiness.  Given the limited credit experiences of many low-income applicants, 
the OCU must rely more heavily on other applicant characteristics in the loan approval 
process. 
  We model the loan approval process at these two types of institutions as follows.  
To determine loan allocation for a randomly selected applicant i at time t, loan officers 
collect and analyze three types of information.  First, they collect all publicly available 
financial information (Fit) that could affect one’s ability to earn income and to repay the 
loan.  This information includes (when available) credit score, income, debt-to-income 
ratio, and bankruptcy history.  Second, they collect personal information (Pit) that could 
affect creditworthiness, including age, presence of a co-applicant, and number of years at 
current address.  Third, a loan officer may also draw conclusions about the applicant’s 
creditworthiness based on data that measure the nature of the applicant’s relationship (Rit) 
with the financial institution prior to this loan application.  This can include the 
applicant’s holding of other accounts at the institution, the number of months that the 
individual has been a member of the institution at the time of application, and the   12 
applicant’s previous loan history.  Each of these measures serves as a proxy for the 
strength of the relationship between the borrower and lender.  
  To estimate this underlying decision, begin by letting Wit* be a latent random 
variable for applicant i which is some measure of the individual’s creditworthiness at 
time t.  Assume that Wit* is a linear function of a set of non-stochastic independent 
variables and an error term.  These covariates include (as discussed above) vectors of 
financial (Fit) and personal (Pit) information; measures of the applicant’s relationship  
with the financial institution (Rit); and other possible determinants (Xit). 
  This credit allocation process can be estimated as follows: 
(1)  Wit* = b0 + F itb1 + Pitb2 + Ritb3 + Xitb4 + eit,        
where eit is assumed to be standard normal. 
  In fact, Wit*, a measure of the individual’s perceived creditworthiness, is not 
recorded.  Only the application decision is observed.  Let Ait = 1 if Wit* exceeds a certain 
amount W
a and the application is approved, and let Ait = 0 if Wit* is less or equal to W
a  
and the application is not approved: 





















Under these conditions, probit analysis is appropriate for estimating the probability of 
loan approval. 
 
3.  Empirical Results 
  In this section, we present the econometric results of a model in which we test for 
the determinants of loan approval at each of these two financial institutions.  Our basic 
model includes covariates that are common to the two data sets.  These covariates include   13 
‘credit score’, ‘missing credit score’, ‘monthly income’ (in thousands), ‘prior bankruptcy’, 
primary applicant’s ‘age’, and presence of a ‘co-applicant’. We also include a proxy for 
the strength of the relationship between borrower and lender, although as discussed above, 
the relationship variables differ slightly between the banks.  For the community bank, we 
include a measure for whether the applicant is an ‘account holder’ with the bank.  For the 
OCU data set, we have a measure that indicates whether the applicant has been a member 
of the OCU for at least ‘two months’
7 and whether the applicant has ‘previously applied’ 
for a Working Wheels loan. Lastly, we add variables that are unique to each of the data 
sets to our basic model to ensure that the results are robust to inclusion of additional 
bank-specific covariates.    
Table 3 presents the results of the basic model.  As shown in column 1, the 
financial variables are critical determinants of the loan decision at the community bank.  
First, ‘credit score’ is a significant and large determinant of loan approval at the 
community bank: a 75 point (the standard deviation for this sub-sample) decrease in 
‘credit score’ would reduce the probability of receiving a car loan by 0.14.  At the same 
time, not having a credit score – which was the case for 11 percent of the community 
bank applicants - decreases the probability of getting a loan by 0.29.  Finally, monthly 
income is also a significant and large predictor: a one standard deviation decrease in 
monthly income (almost $2,500) decreases the probability of receiving a loan by 0.09.  
As one would expect, financial characteristics are critical in the loan approval process at 
the community bank. 
  By contrast, the measure of relationship lending is not statistically significant at 
the community bank.  We argue that this measure, holding an account at the bank, is a   14 
relatively strong measure of relationship lending: being an account holder implies that the 
client has had a previous interaction with a member of the bank and has an established 
history.  Therefore, the fact that this measure is not a statistically significant predictor of 
receiving a car loan is quite telling: for customers of this community bank, the chances of 
getting a car loan are largely determined by financial characteristics, above all else. The 
finding that the community bank relies more on hard information than soft information is 
supported by the fact that the loan application only included information on whether or 
not the applicant had an existing account with the bank. When we requested information 
about how long applicants were account holders at the bank, the loan officer confirmed 
that this information would be difficult if not impossible to obtain and was not used in 
actual loan decisions.  As shown in column 2, our finding that the borrower-lender 
relationship is insignificant is robust to the inclusion of additional covariates such as 
‘years at present address’, ‘resident in bank’s town’, and ‘total debt’.
8 
  How does this compare to the OCU?  As shown in column 3, the financial 
variables are also critical determinants of the loan decision at the OCU.  For this sub-
sample of less financially well-off Vermonters, ‘credit score’ is also a significant and 
large determinant of loan approval at the community bank: a 65 point (the standard 
deviation for this sub-sample) decrease in ‘credit score’ would reduce the probability of 
receiving a car loan by 0.18.  But by contrast to the community bank, not having a credit 
score – which was the case for 56 percent of the OCU applicants – does not significantly 
decrease the probability of getting a loan.  More than any other result, this shows that the 
OCU is clearly targeting clients who would have difficulty obtaining car loans elsewhere.  
Finally, income is also a significant and large predictor in this sub-sample, even though   15 
the mean incomes for this sub-sample are much lower: a one standard deviation decrease 
in income ($975) decreases the probability of receiving a loan by 0.11.  For this sub-
sample, we also add a ‘no income’ dummy, as 207 of the 609 ‘Working Wheels’ 
applicants have no stable income.9  Remarkably, as shown in columns 3 and 4, clients 
without a regular income do not have a lower probability of receiving a ‘Working 
Wheels’ loan (statistically insignificant coefficients of -0.010 and -0.027, respectively).  
For this sub-sample, financial characteristics are also critical in the loan approval process, 
but clients with a limited financial history – and even without a regular income – are still 
able to secure car loans.     
  In the case of the OCU, both measures of relationship lending are statistically 
significant.  Column 3 illustrates that, ceteris paribus, being a member of the OCU for at 
least two months increases the probability of receiving a car loan by 0.30.  Column 4 
illustrates that if a client has previously applied for a car loan, this increases the 
probability of receiving a car loan by almost the same percentage, 0.31.  Controlling for 
financial characteristics, relationship lending has a significant, very large effect on the 
loan process for Working Wheels clients.        
  We performed a number of robustness tests on these results.  First, as noted above, 
we find similar results if we replace the at least ‘two month’ membership measure with at 
least ‘one month’ or at least ‘three month’ measures.  As confirmed by the OCU loan 
officers, the empirical results suggest that the lender-client relationship is rapidly 
established in the Working Wheels program.  Second, we added information on debt-to-
income and the referring agency
10 to the model but, as shown in columns 5 and 6, the 
results on ‘credit score,’ ‘no credit score,’ and the relationship variables are the same.   16 
Third, we included both measures of relationship lending (‘two months membership’ and 
‘previous application’) together in the same model, even though results are likely biased 
because of multicollinearity (the correlation coefficient between these two variables is 
0.61).  According to this alternative model, if a Working Wheels applicant has been an 
OCU member for two months and had applied previously, this increases the probability 
of receiving a car loan by 0.39, slightly more (than shown in columns 4 and 5) when each 
of these measures is tested alone.
11   
 
4.  Conclusion 
  This paper provides preliminary evidence that as consolidation, deregulation and 
technology move mainstream financial institutions away from relationship lending and 
toward credit scoring, community development credit unions (CDCUs) will occupy an 
increasingly critical niche as the credit-supplier for low income and traditionally 
underserved populations. Using actual loan applications from a CDCU and a more 
traditional community bank, we find that financial information, particularly credit score, 
is the primary determinant of loan approval at the community bank; low-income 
households with imperfect or non-existent credit histories are very unlikely to receive car 
loans from this traditional bank (e.g., those without documented credit scores are almost 
30% less likely to obtain a car loan than otherwise similar individuals with credit scores). 
We further show that the community bank, which collects very little soft information on 
applicants, does not rely on relationship lending in its loan decisions; holding a prior 
account with the bank has no significant impact on loan approval at the community bank.   17 
  In contrast, relationship lending is a critical factor in the car loan decision at the 
CDCU. Loan officers require that applicants join the credit union and establish a share 
account. Applicants are encouraged to obtain character references from employers, 
landlords and community members and to work with bank officers to build financial 
management skills. Our findings suggest that this reliance on soft information is 
important; low-income households with poor or unknown credit histories, but strong ties 
to the institution, are able to receive car loans at the CDCU. In particular, individuals 
without credit scores suffer no significant disadvantage in the loan process and, 
furthermore, membership at the CDCU for at least two months increases the probability 
of receiving a car loan by 30%. This is in direct contrast to the community bank where 
lack of credit history decreased the probability of receiving a loan by almost 30% and 
account holders received no preferential treatment in the loan decision. 
  We believe that these empirical findings from Vermont demonstrate an 
ongoing challenge in the provision of financial services in the United States.  Despite the 
existence of sophisticated and efficient capital markets in the U.S., many low-income and 
minority groups do not have bank accounts and are unable to obtain loans in mainstream 
consumer credit markets. For example, nearly 10% of all U.S. households and twenty-
two percent of low-income families lack a checking or savings account (Aizcorbe, 
Kennickell, and Moore 2003; Barr 2003). Without this basic tool, households lack a safe 
place to save for a home, car, education, and retirement, thereby resorting to costly 
check-cashers and other fringe (and less regulated) suppliers for basic transaction needs. 
Furthermore, low-income and minority families often report difficulty establishing credit 
or qualifying for loans with conventional lenders (Attanasio, Goldberg and Kyriazidou   18 
2000; Grant 2003; Villegas 1989). Those who are credit constrained in mainstream 
markets are forced to rely on payday lending, title loans, rent-to-own, pawn broking and 
tax refund anticipation loans with typical annualized interest rates over 100 percent (but 
often as high as 500 percent) and stiff pre-payment penalties (Barr 2004; Caskey 2002). 
Reliance on this largely unregulated alternative financial sector not only undermines the 
financial stability of the poor, but also imposes negative externalities on the rest of 
society (Barr 2004). 
  Mainstream financial institutions, particularly traditional commercial banks, may 
be reluctant to open accounts and extend loans to poor families due to the perceived 
higher costs and lower profitability associated with low income customers.  Such clients 
are more likely to bounce checks, have smaller, less stable balances, require more time 
from customer service and have poorer credit histories than their wealthier counterparts 
(Hogarth and O’Donnell 2000). As pressure to return high profits to shareholders 
increases, it is likely that traditional banks will increasingly rely on high volume, ‘cookie 
cutter’ loans based on credit scoring to assess client risk.  In the absence of well-
developed mechanisms for relationship lending in financial institutions like the OCU, this 
will further limit the availability of credit to low-income clients whose imperfect or non-
existent credit histories require more time-consuming risk assessments and customized 
loan products.   19 
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Table 1.     Averages for Loan Applicants at the Community Bank 
         
    Approved  Rejected  p-value 
    (n = 249)  (n = 360)  on difference
* 
         
Demographic variables 
  Age  36.0  33.6  .130 
  Resident in bank’s town  0.25  0.22  .336 
  Years at present address  7.58  5.14  .022 
  Relationship  0.81  0.70  .022 
 
Financial variables 
  Monthly income  3607  2433  <.001 
  Missing monthly income  .02  .03  .368 
  Declared bankruptcy  .04  .10  .036 
         
Loan-specific variables 
  Co-applicant  .51  .32  .003 
  Credit score  686  607  <.001 
  Missing credit score  .09  .20  .004 
  Car value  9433  8649  .255 
  Loan-to-value ratio  80.92  87.95  .025 
  Missing loan-to-value ratio  .05  .33  <.001 
  Markup  3.09  4.31  <.001 
  Missing markup  .01  .26  <.001 
         
Note: 
* for a one-tailed alternative 
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Table 2.     Averages for Loan Applicants at the OCU 
         
    Approved  Rejected  p-value 
    (n = 249)  (n = 360)  on difference* 
         
Demographic variables 
  Age  37.6  35.8  .038 
  Female  .77  .74  .183 
  Relationship  .72  .37  <.001 
         
Financial variables 
  Monthly income  1487  1128  <.001 
  Missing monthly income  .24  .42  <.001 
  Declared bankruptcy  .04  .07  .081 
  Debt-to-income ratio  28.2  40.9  <.001 
  Missing debt-to-income ratio  .25  .38  <.001 
         
Loan-specific variables 
  Co-applicant  .16  .11  .029 
  Previous application  .37  .13  <.001 
  Credit score  601  558  <.001 
  Missing credit score  .47  .62  <.001 
         
Note: 
* for a one-tailed alternative 
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Table 3.        Probit Regression Results 
 
  Community Bank Models  OCU Models 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Relationship Variables 
   
Account held  .0949  .0485 
    (.0652)  (.0568)   
Two-month membership      .2998**    .3052** 
      (.0427)    (.0441)   
Previous application          .3109**    .3058** 
          (.0519)    (.0534) 
  All Other Variables 
   
Credit score  .0019**  .0017**  .0028**  .0030**  .0031**     .0032** 
    (.0003)  (.0033)  (.0005)  (.0006)  (.0006)  (.0006) 
 
Missing credit score  -.2893**  -.2020*  -.0369  .0011  -.0665  -.0334 
  (.0980)  (.1053)  (.0473)  (.0480)  (.0493)  (.0501) 
 
Monthly income (000s)  .0373**  .0377**  .1176**  .1250**  .1041**  .1112* 
  (.0140)  (.0137)  (.0338)  (.0375)  (.0349)  (.0396) 
 
Missing monthly income      -.0104  -.0267  -.1570  -.1657 
      (.0616)  (.0635)  (.0994)  (.1036) 
 
Declared bankruptcy  -.0928  -.0555  -.1481  -.1825*   -.1585  -.1933* 
  (.1150)  (.0984)  (.0813)  (.0775)  (.0815)  (.0776) 
 
Age  -.0001  -.0007  .0022  .0030  .0025  .0033 
  (.0018)  (.0019)  (.0018)  (.0018)  (.0019)  (.0019) 
 
Co-applicant  .0218  -.0240  -.0572  -.0933  -.0836  -.1176 
  (.0512)  (.0541)  (.0681)  (.0691)  (.0693)  (.0696) 
 
Years at present address    .0088** 
    (.0033) 
 
Resident in bank’s town    -.0294 
    (.0524) 
 
Total debt    -.0051** 
    (.0014) 
 
Debt-to-income ratio          -.0066**  -.0066** 
            (.0014)  (.0013) 
               
Missing debt-to-income ratio           -.0423  -.0532 
            (.1077)  (.1088) 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
  * Significant at the .05 level. 
  ** Significant at the .01 level. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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1  “Relationship lending” refers to lending decisions that incorporate soft information 
(knowledge about a borrower’s character, motivation, etc.) obtained through personal 
interactions between borrower and lender.     
2 For example, the number of community banks and credit unions in the United States has 
declined over 50 percent since 1980, while the share of industry assets held by the ten 
largest bank holding companies has increased from less than 25% to over 75%  
(DeYoung, Hunter and Udell, 2004; NCUA Annual Report 2002).   
3 In fact, nearly all CDCUs are designated “Low Income” by the National Credit Union 
Association (NCUA) meaning that more than half of its members earn less than 80 
percent of the average of all wage earners as established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
or have annual household incomes that fall at or below 80 percent of the median 
household income as established by the Census Bureau (Section 701.34 NCUA Rules and 
Regulations, accessed online at www.ncua.gov). 
4 The National Federation of Community Development Unions claims 225 member 
institutions, distributed over 43 states. Two-thirds serve urban areas with the densest 
concentrations in the Northeast and Southeast. The median CDCU has $1.4 million in 
assets and serves over 1000 members (www.natfed.org). 
5 All Working Wheels loan applicants are required to establish an account with the bank 
in order to submit a loan application; thus we cannot use “prior account with the bank” as 
a measure of relationship strength.  
6 Recall that “relationship” is defined differently for the two institutions. 
7 For the results reported below, we generate essentially the same results if we replace 
this length of membership by at least one month or at least three months.   27 
                                                                                                                                                    
8 ‘Years at present address’ controls for residential stability and risk of flight.  
9 There were no applicants without stable income at the community bank. 
10 Many Working Wheels clients are referred to the OCU by one of the five Community 
Action Agencies (CAAs): Community Action in Southwestern Vermont  (Bennington 
and Rutland Counties); Central Vermont Community Action Council; Champlain Valley 
Office of Economic Opportunity; Northeast Kingdom Community Action; and 
Southeastern Vermont Community Action.  These are a diverse set of community-based 
social agencies, located throughout the state, that help low-income households find 
access to no-cost or low-cost services, including emergency health care and financial 
support.  We include dummy variables reflecting the referral agency in columns (5) and 
(6) but omit these results for the sake of brevity. 
11 Of the 609 Working Wheels applicants, 118 have either been an OCU member for two 
months or have applied before; another 122 have been an OCU member for two months 
and have applied before.  In the model that includes both of these relationship measures, 
the (significant) coefficients on these two regressors are 0.227 for ‘two months 
membership’ and 0.168 for ‘previous application’.    